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Anticipating Endangerment 
The Biopolitics of Threatened Species Lists 
Abstract  
The last two decades have witnessed an explosion of national and global lists of threatened and 
endangered species. This article draws on interviews with prominent list managers and observations of 
their assessments to explore the scientific practices of list-making in the context of species conservation. 
Delving into the complex calculations of risk and threat that take place in the process of ranking 
nonhuman species based on their probability of extinction, the article explores the threatened species list 
as a biopolitical technology of catastrophe governance. My focus on two prominent lists—the IUCN Red 
List of Threatened Species and NatureServe’s assessment system—illuminates various characteristics of 
futuristic governance through the threatened species list, including its properties as a list-database hybrid 
and as a barometer of life. I also explore the biopolitical regime of ranking life and its focus on species, its 
governing of direct (human) threats and the nature-culture binary that this promotes, its status as scientific 
and apolitical and its aspiration for global reach, and the “species experts” versus “threat experts” divide 
that underpins its operations. The article concludes with a discussion on the effects of the lists’ increasing 
automation and “algorithmization,” as seen from the perspective of the lists’ managers. The lists’ “threat 
calculator” in particular quantifies and projects present and future threats to nonhuman species, using 
fuzzy numbers, ordinal scales, and open standards to anticipate and prevent the forth-coming Sixth 
Extinction. 
 
Keywords: threatened species lists, biopolitics, algorithms, catastrophe governing, fuzzy numbers, threat 
calculator 
The last two decades have witnessed an explosion of regional, national, and global lists of 
threatened and endangered species. By 2010, at least 109 countries had produced some form of a 
national list of threatened species (Miller, 2013, p. 198), and more than 25 listing systems of 
threatened species lists were used in North America alone (ibid., p. 192). This article will draw 
on my previous work on the biopolitical properties of threatened species lists and their economic 
regimes (Braverman, 2016; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c), as well as on a range of interviews with 
prominent list managers and observations of threat assessments, to explore species 
conservation’s governing of present-future catastrophe through threat. I will focus on two 
prominent lists in particular: the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red 
List of Threatened Species (hereafter, the Red List), which is the first and most comprehensive 
attempt at a worldwide listing of threatened species by the oldest and largest global 
environmental organization, and NatureServe’s imperiled status rankings, which are generated 
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from this organization’s massive database that documents the status of species and ecosystems in 
the United States and Canada. In 2000, NatureServe (then “the Association for Biodiversity 
Information”) separated from The Nature Conservancy to become its own independent nonprofit.  
The Red List and NatureServe have both had an incredible impact on environmental 
decision-makers around the world and in the North American region, respectively (Possingham 
et al., 2002; Rodrigues et al., 2006). Specifically, the Red List has inspired the development of 
numerous national and regional threatened species lists and functions as an important source for 
prioritizing protections under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)—a uniquely powerful international convention on trade (Miller, 
2013). As for NatureServe, this organization actively collaborates with government agencies 
such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and the U.S. Transportation 
Research Board, as well as with individual scientists, universities, and private organizations. 
NatureServe also feeds data into the Red List database, and the two organizations collaborate on 
ongoing assessments.  
Nonetheless, scientists working on both lists insist that they are producing scientific 
threat rankings that do not carry direct regulatory power. The article will dwell on the myriad 
ways in which the scientific list is constructed, and on the enhanced political authority derived 
from its specific presentation as apolitical. I will also explore how threatened species lists are 
rendered actionable by government agencies such as British Columbia—with its Guidance for 
Threat Assessments and its adoption of the Threat Calculator—and by the Committee on the 
Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC)—the statutory body of scientific experts 
who assess and recommend how to rank Canada’s imperiled species to the Canadian 
Government. 
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My article is situated at the nexus between a Foucaultian analytic of nonhuman 
biopolitics (Biermann and Mansfield, 2014; Lorimer, 2015; Rutherford and Rutherford, 2013; 
Shukin, 2009; Wolfe, 2015), related scholarship in geography and science and technology 
studies (STS) about the role of databases and models in governing nonhuman life (Bowker, 
2000; Braverman, 2015c; Youatt, 2008), and the emerging literature on the present anticipation 
of futures (Adams and Grove, 2007; Anderson, 2010a; 2010b; Aradau and van Munster, 2011). 
The article will draw on these diverse scholarly accounts to explore the threatened species list as 
an exemplary biopolitical technology for catastrophe governance (Aradau and van Munster, 
2011).  
 “List-keeping is at the heart of our body politic,” argues Geoffrey Bowker in the 
conclusion to his seminal article on biodiversity databases, yet he does not develop this argument 
further (2000, p. 676). Drawing on Bowker’s study of databases, I will continue where he left off 
by documenting the particular work of the endangered list in species conservation. I will ask: 
What does the technology of the threatened species list add to that of the threatened species 
database? While the database does not rank, the list does. The list’s rankings, moreover, 
establish a system of prioritization that is future oriented. In other words, the threatened species 
list adds a futuristic element to the past- and present-focused database, not only assessing and 
ranking the endangerment level of species but also impelling action upon this ranking (albeit 
presenting itself, as mentioned already, as scientific and neutral and thus as not impelling any 
action).  
 In his work on anticipatory futures, Ben Anderson suggests that it is especially in 
response to three major threats to liberal-democratic life that anticipatory action has been 
formalized and legitimized: terrorism, trans-species epidemics, and climate change (2010b, p. 
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779). Despite the many differences between these three threats, he offers, they share several 
common characteristics: they are potentially catastrophic, namely each can irreversibly alter the 
conditions of life; the source of the disaster is somewhat vague; and the disaster is imminent, i.e. 
without some form of action “a threshold will be crossed and a disastrous future will come 
about” (ibid., p. 780). The problem that these three threats pose for efforts to protect certain 
forms of valued life, Anderson argues, is that they pertain to the future and are thus inherently 
uncertain.  
This article proposes the existence of a fourth high profile threat to liberal-democratic 
life: extinction. Conservation discourses are increasingly proliferating that warn about our 
irreversible entry into the Anthropocene—the Age of Man—where massive, mainly human-
caused eradications of nonhuman species threaten our existence on this earth, and the earth’s 
existence altogether (Lorimer, 2015). Such events have famously been referred to as the Sixth 
Extinction. Elizabeth Kolbert, who coined this term, explains that, “If extinction is a morbid 
topic, mass extinction is, well, massively so” (2014, p. 3). Contra to Beck’s thesis regarding the 
“incalculability” of certain modern risks, Anderson documents a range of practices that have 
been deployed to render the future present (2010, p. 783). The first practice he discusses, which 
is also the most relevant to species conservation, is calculation. It is in this context that Anderson 
emphasizes the importance of numbers, “which are then visualized in forms of ‘mechanical 
objectivity’ such as tables, charts, and graphs” (see also Porter, 1995). Still in the calculation 
context, Anderson highlights the extensive use of catastrophe modelling, for example the 
insurance industry’s use of algorithmic models to predict and calculate loss by stochastic events 
(2010, p. 784).  
And if massive species extinction is perceived as a future catastrophic event that looms 
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over the existence of life as we know it, creating expansive databases, enumerating the relative 
viability and mortality rates of species, and calculating their risk and threat of extinction are at 
the core of the present scientific attempts to render this future actionable. By and large, 
conservation scientists have been performing and presenting such calculations and ranking in the 
form of a list: the threatened species list (for a discussion of the reasons for this, see Braverman, 
2016; 2015b). Focusing on the threatened species list, this article will unravel the laborious 
calculations that go into ranking nonhuman species on a linear scale further from, or closer to, 
extinction. The listing of life is thus also a making of this life—it grants life. This interpretation 
infuses new meanings to the phrase “the liveliness of lists” (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999), which 
originally referred to the lists’ ability to constantly proliferate and evolve. My article traces the 
liveliness of lists back to the flesh-and-blood scientists who create them and examines how they 
themselves conceive of their work.  
The article will identify several elements of governing future catastrophe through 
biopolitical list-making, including the threatened species list’s properties as a list-database hybrid 
and as a barometer of life, its regime of ranking life and its focus on species, its governing of 
direct (human) threats and the nature-culture binary that this promotes, its status as scientific and 
apolitical and its aspiration for global reach, and the “species experts” versus “threat experts” 
divide that underpins its operations. The article will also highlight the threatened species list’s 
increasing automation and “algorithmization,” as seen from the perspective of the list’s 
scientists/managers, and the power of this heightened algorithmization to harness the unknown 
and translate it into authoritative rankings. Discussing the gradual shift of the list’s calculations 
toward algorithms and automation, I explore the tensions that this process engenders between 
mystifying and demystifying the list’s biopolitical operations. Specifically, whereas the 
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threatened species list-database boasts of providing publicly accessible and transparent 
information, the production of this information becomes increasingly complicated as it is 
engulfed in a cloud of numbers, models, and algorithms. The list’s “threat calculator” in 
particular quantifies, automates, and projects present and future threats to nonhuman species, 
using different technologies such as fuzzy numbers, ordinal scales, and open standards to 
account for uncertainty so as to better anticipate and prevent the forth-coming Sixth Extinction. 
Initially formulated in 1975 by Lotfi Zadeh as instances of fuzzy sets (Wang, 2014, p. 82), fuzzy 
numbers are generalizations of real numbers in that rather than referring to one single value, they 
refer to a connected set of possible values. Calculations with fuzzy numbers are part of an 
arithmetic theory that embraces uncertainty and renders it quantifiably, thereby establishing a 
fuzzy regime of governance.    
The Biopolitics of Lists 
 I have argued elsewhere that threatened species lists are biopolitical technologies par 
excellence (Braverman, 2016; 2015a). The power of threatened species lists, I have contended, is 
founded upon their capacity to order life at the level of the biological species—what Foucault 
refers to as biopolitics, as distinct from (yet entangled and coproduced with) anatomopolitics 
(Foucault, 1990). Although Foucault limited his analysis to human populations, a significant 
body of work has recently emerged that expands it to nonhumans (e.g., Shukin, 2009; Rutherford 
and Rutherford, 2013; Wolfe, 2012), some of which focuses on conservation in particular 
(Biermann and Mansfield, 2014; Braverman, 2015c; Lorimer, 2015; Youatt, 2008). An 
interesting vantage may be gained from thinking about how the compilation of endangered 
species lists is a way of aggregating and calculating biodiversity at national, regional, and global 
scales, not unlike the ways that the “population” emerged out of the compilation of vital statistics 
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and calculations of birth, morbidity, and mortality rates. But whereas in the case of human 
populations, the problem of morbid death has lately given away to that of morbid living: to a 
focus on “the quality of lived lives” and the “governmentalization of the living” (Wahlberg and 
Rose, 2015, p. 62), the discourse of species endangerment is still in the precursor stage, whereby 
the population-species serves as the central object of study, categorization, calculation, and 
ranking. 
 Of the various possible units of conservation, the project of thinking and governing 
through regimes that focus on species arguably lends itself most effectively to mainstream 
conservation’s goal of preventing loss of biodiversity and extinction. Species are the core units 
by which biodiversity is measured and defined. The species unit enables both an abstraction—a 
grid over the Linnaean kingdoms (Foucault, 1970)—and an embodiment: a way of putting a 
singular and legible face on far less concrete conservation concepts such as ecosystems, habitats, 
and populations (Braverman, 2015a, p. 22). “The world of biodiversity data is radically 
singular,” Bowker reflects (2000, p. 649). Furthermore, since humans understand themselves 
primarily as an exceptional species and therefore both relate to, and differentiate themselves 
from, other species, the project of classifying species has been central to the taxonomic ordering 
of the natural world (Braverman, 2016).  
Indeed, for many conservation scientists the species is the foundational ontological unit 
through which (nonhuman) life can be calculated and known (Sandler, 2012). Compiling lists of 
threatened species enables the arrangement of species according to their viability and mortality 
rates, thereby rendering them comparable. Through their en-listing, down- and up-listing, multi-
listing, and un-listing, nonhuman species can also be differentially governed, affirming and 
justifying which lives are more and most important to save (Braverman, 2016, p. 21). “It is 
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important to identify those species that are endangered and those that are not,” write 
conservation biologist Mark Burgman and his colleagues, “this being one of the parameters that 
determines the allocation of funds for protection of species.” They explain that, “Lists are used to 
set priorities for conservation attention and funding, to elicit donations and votes in the political 
arena, and the number of endangered species is used as a benchmark in environmental reporting” 
(Burgman et al., 2010, p. 102). Finally, the threatened species list also reifies the distinction 
between those who save (humans) and those who may be saved but who cannot save 
(nonhumans) (Braverman, 2016, p. 21).  
At the same time, the potential death of so many species or other forms of life who are 
not rare, charismatic, or visible enough to warrant the threatened status designation—in 
Bowker’s words, those “Things That Do Not Get Classified” (2000, p. 655)—falls outside the 
list altogether. As I have mentioned elsewhere, “[s]uch life forms are effectively ‘list-less’: 
incalculable, unmemorable, and thus killable” (Braverman, 2016, p. 23). But while much recent 
biopolitical work emphasizes thanatopolitics or necropolitics, this article adopts Foucault’s 
affirmative stance on biopolitics, highlighting “the ways in which biopolitics can be more about 
life than death, about inclusion rather than exclusion” (Rutherford and Rutherford, 2013, p. 429). 
The fate of those listless species’ lives who fall outside the realm of the threatened list does not 
configure into this account, which focuses instead on the viability and actionability of the listed.  
Yet such a focus on the affirmative does not entail a disavowal of death. Quite the 
contrary, “to make live does not mean to avoid death altogether but to manage death at the level 
of the population. In a biopolitical regime, death is transformed into a rate of mortality, which is 
open to intervention and management. This transformation erases the fact that not all life is 
equally promoted” (Biermann and Mansfield, 2014, p. 259). Conservation management through 
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species is especially potent because it corresponds more readily to the life-death binary than 
alternative conservation frameworks such as ecosystems. Ecologist Don Faber-Langendoen 
explains, accordingly, that “we think of extinction as a species term: there’s a genetic pool that’s 
gone when a species goes extinct” (interview). By contrast, ecosystems “don’t really go away in 
the same way,” he tells me. “Even if they fall apart, there are still pieces around.” This is because 
“ecosystems are loosely organized entities, they’re not highly organized like species, so there’s 
always been a variety of approaches to classifying them” (ibid.). In light of their adaptability to 
biopolitical enframings such as mortality and extinction rates, and because they are both more 
visible and also lend themselves more readily to classificatory regimes and numeric calculations, 
species modalities have been the fundamental “elements of conservation” (Faber-Langendoen, 
interview), the central units for the scientific assessment of extinction risks. Accordingly, even 
when listers rank ecosystems (e.g., the IUCN Red List for Ecosystems and NatureServe’s 
ecosystem assessments), their calculations are based on models that were initially developed for 
species (ibid.). 
Governing Threat through Lists 
The threatened species list’s focus on species goes hand-in-hand with its modality of 
catastrophe governance, which seeks to identify and quantify present and future risks and threats 
to species with the goal of predicting and preventing their future extinctions. As the emerging 
security literature has shown, albeit mainly in the context of the terrorist attack, the definition 
and measurement of threat are central to the operation of anticipatory security regimes (Adams 
and Grove, 2007; Anderson, 2010a; 2010b; Aradau and van Munster, 2011).  
How is threat defined and calculated in the context of species conservation regimes? 
British Columbia’s Guidance for Threat Assessments presents a useful example. The Guidance 
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relies heavily on both the Red List and NatureServe to define threats as “the proximate activities 
or processes that have caused, are causing, or may cause in the future the destruction, 
degradation, and/or impairment of the entity being assessed (population, species, community or 
ecosystem) in the area of interest (globe, nation, or subnation)” (British Columbia Guidance, 
2014, p. 1). The Guidance qualifies, however, that “for purposes of threat assessment, only 
present and future threats are considered” (ibid.). This disregard of the past makes sense, as 
conservation’s listing project is “a performative process of rendering the future actionable” 
(Anderson, 2010a, p. 229).  
In addition to the performative role highlighted by Anderson, however, my analysis 
emphasizes the list’s biopolitical functions: it is through the list’s detailed calculations of threat, 
and its production of hierarchical rankings of species lives based on this threat, that the project of 
making life is rendered actionable. To make it so, “expert knowledge needs to tackle its very 
limit: the unknown” (Aradau and van Munster, 2011, p. 6). As the security scholarship points 
out, risk (and threat) are different from uncertainty in the same way that “known unknowns” are 
different from “unknown unknowns.” “’Unknown unknowns, ‘expecting the unexpected,’ 
‘imagining the unimaginable’—these all speak to the idea that while future catastrophic events 
need to be made actionable, they can’t be planned for” (ibid., p. 107).   
 The Conservation Measures Partnership (CMP), a consortium of conservation 
organizations whose mission is to advance the practice of conservation by credibly assessing the 
effectiveness of conservation actions, focuses its assessments on “direct threats” (CMP, 2013, p. 
12). Matt Muir of the CMP explains the practical advantages of this focus, and the relationship of 
threat to the unknown more generally: 
 [L]ack of knowledge never killed an elephant. Lack of knowledge may be an important 
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factor or driver of something else that causes elephants to die, but we really want to make 
sure that our applicants and grantees can articulate what that thing is that kills elephants. 
Maybe it’s [that] they’re using a certain pesticide on their crops that is incredibly toxic to 
elephants. . . . [W]hat we’re trying to impact is the human behavior using that pesticide, 
[and not just general] ignorance and lack of knowledge (interview). 
Muir therefore perceives threats as anchors that, through their materiality, can surpass the 
unknown. “They keep you sort of anchored to the ground as all these other currents swirl around 
you,” he tells me. “Conditions are always changing on the ground,” Muir continues. “There may 
be political changes, there may be funding fads.” The focus on direct threats therefore “helps us 
understand what actually needs to happen, what human activity needs to change for the status of 
that conservation target to improve” (ibid.; emphasis added). Threat is what ties present to future 
through calculations that render the unknown known and actionable. 
Tracing the ways in which threat is calculated also highlights how the nature-culture 
divide rears its multifarious head even in what seems like a technical and value-free enterprise 
(Braverman, 2016, pp. 28-32). For example, the threat assessment models studied for this project 
all emphasize direct threats by human activity; they do not include “biological features of the 
species or population such as inbreeding depression, small population size, and genetic 
isolation,” which are instead considered “limiting factors.” Defining the biological as a “factor” 
rather than as a “threat” resonates with traditional perceptions of agency as existing solely in the 
human realm, while biological attributes are deemed agentless. The British Columbia Guidance 
states along these lines:  
For the most part, threats are related to human activities, but they can be natural. The 
impact of human activity may be direct (e.g., destruction of habitat) or indirect (e.g., 
DRAFT_Final article available for download at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41292-016-0025-0  
 12 
invasive species introduction). Effects of natural phenomena (e.g., fire, hurricane, 
flooding) may be especially important when the species or ecosystem is concentrated in 
one location or has few occurrences, which may be a result of human activity. As such, 
natural phenomena are included in the definition of a threat, though [they] should be 
applied cautiously (ibid.; notes and citations eliminated).  
As the Guidance clarifies, natural threats may be considered only if they are created or enhanced 
by human activity. Dave Fraser of British Columbia’s Ministry of Environment explains that 
“natural threats are generally regarded as part of the milieu [that] the species evolved with. 
However, if the ‘natural’ threat is thought to be above background levels or a stochastic event 
can cause severe declines in the species, it would be ranked in the threats calculator” (Fraser, e-
mail communication). Matt Muir of the CMP reflects: “To be honest, I don’t think I’ve ever 
worked on a project that has used that wiggle room of focusing-in on natural phenomenon. There 
are enough problems to deal with in the world that are caused by human activities that we don’t 
need to go into the natural phenomenon” (interview). Faber-Langendoen remarks similarly in 
this context: “In the current environment we are such a big threat that you may as well spend 
your time thinking about human threats” (interview).   
Although no longer taken at face value by many conservationists (as evident by Fraser’s 
use of scare quotes when referring to “natural” threats), the nature-culture binary, embodied here 
in the idea that one can make clear-cut distinctions between human-induced and “natural” 
threats, nonetheless performs a prominent role in the particular calculations of threat and risk 
performed through species conservation databases and models. In contrast with Bowker’s 
statement that “it is within the database that the nature/society hybrid so well described by 
Latour and Haraway is born” (Bowker, 2000, p. 661; citations omitted), I would thus contend 
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that within the threatened list database the nature-culture bifurcation not only gets reinstated but 
is simultaneously obscured behind the list’s technical calculations. In what follows, I will trace 
the processes through which the list has come to be so highly calculated.  
The List’s Scientific Turn 
For the last five decades, the IUCN Red List has provided “a map of how to do 
conservation” (Lamoreux, interview). During this time, the nature of list-making has also 
changed considerably. Don Faber-Langendoen is a senior ecologist at NatureServe and has been 
involved in the IUCN’s listing of species and ecosystems going back to the beginning of these 
projects. He tells me that “the sense that governments should prevent extinction was not 
something that really hit the radar screen until the 1960s and 1970s,” at which point 
“governments suddenly needed to figure out which species were most at risk” (Faber-
Langendoen, interview). This occurred, in his view, mostly as a response to novel legislative 
changes introduced into the political sphere, such as the United States’ Endangered Species Act 
of 1973. Faber-Langendoen recounts the need to quickly respond to these statutory challenges: 
“We started out as a ‘BOGSAT’: a Bunch Of Guys Sitting Around a Table. Then we moved into 
the stage of saying, ‘Well, let’s make the discussion more transparent. Let’s write down and 
record the ways in which we consider these factors’” (interview). Accordingly, in 1994 the 
IUCN radically altered its formerly expert-based and discretionary ranking system into one that 
is rule-based and quantitative, and finalized these categories and criteria in 2001 (IUCN, 2001; 
see also Mace et al., 2008).  
Red List scientists Georgina Mace et al. describe the rationales behind this quantitative 
reform, and behind the scientification of the list more broadly. In order to provide a global index 
of biodiversity and identify those species most in need of conservation attention, they explain, 
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“the classification system must be objective and transparent. It also needs to be applicable to a 
variety of species and habitats; standardized to yield consistent results independent of the 
assessor or the species being assessed; accessible to allow a variety of species experts to use it; 
scientifically defensible; and reasonably rigorous (i.e. it should be hard to classify species 
inappropriately)” (Mace et al., 2008, p. 1427). Another Red List scientist writes that the list in its 
revised format is designed to provide “a standardized, consistent, and transparent method for 
assessing extinction risk, thereby increasing the objectivity and scientific credibility of the 
assessments” (Miller, 2013, p. 195).  
The quantitative reform in threatened species governance has enabled a more global 
(geographically), universal (between species), and comparable (on both fronts) enterprise to 
emerge, at the same time making the list more globally actionable. These quantitative 
dimensions are also imbricated with other scientific characteristics of the list: objectivity, 
transparency, and repeatability. One scientist told me that this means that if another expert were 
to conduct the same assessment, she would reach the same result (Brooks, interview). The 
Guidelines for Appropriate Uses of IUCN Red List Data instruct accordingly: “The IUCN Red 
List is developed through contributions from a network of thousands of scientific experts around 
the world. . . . It uses a scientific process based upon objective criteria. Assessments are 
impartial, independent, and not politically driven. . . . The IUCN Red List is therefore a synthesis 
of the best available species knowledge from the top experts” (IUCN, 2011).  
By emphasizing the strong correlation between scientific and global authority, the 
threatened species list transcends national politics, supporting a broad-scaled spatial and 
temporal mode of governance. Still, the mantra of the scientists involved in the listing project is 
that the list merely lists. The IUCN Guidelines emphasize, accordingly, that “the Red List should 
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not be interpreted as a means of priority setting. . . . The category of threat simply provides an 
assessment of the extinction risk under current circumstances, whereas a system for assessing 
priorities for action will include numerous other factors concerning conservation action such as 
costs, logistics, chances of success, and other biological characteristics” (IUCN, 2014, p. 17). 
Similarly, NatureServe scientists reject the idea that its scientific listing is sufficient for assigning 
protections according to the U.S. Endangered Species Act. “They’re not policy,” Don Faber-
Langendoen tells me about NatureServe rankings. “They’re information that’s publicly available, 
and Fish and Wildlife Service can use it to inform their actual policy decisions about what’s 
endangered versus what’s common, et cetera” (interview). Kieran Suckling of the Center for 
Biological Diversity explains this insistence on scientificity on the part of threatened species list 
managers: “the IUCN and NatureServe see themselves as being critical to creating and upholding 
the scientific consensus which, through its mere existence, places pressure on political 
interventions in regulatory decisions. So they [must] keep [themselves] out of the regulatory 
nexus as much as possible” (e-mail communication).  
Although by its very nature, the threatened species list assigns value and priority to 
endangerment (for why else would endangerment be its sole measure?), it is precisely to 
maintain the scientific power of its judgment that the list’s administrators insist that it is value-
free. This insistence on the part of the conservationists that the Red List is never political but 
only scientific exposes the underlying ideal “that science describes nature (and nature alone) and 
that politics is about social power (and social power alone)” (Bowker and Star, 1999, p. 46). 
The Public Database-List 
To properly function as a biopolitical technology for future governance, the threatened 
species list must be founded upon, and must exist alongside, a meaningful database. 
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Accordingly, each of the Red List categories contains a list of species alongside details of their 
conservation assessment, all publicly accessible in the Red List’s online database. Similarly, the 
NatureServe Explorer is a web-based database providing public access to information on more 
than 70,000 plants, animals, fungi, and ecosystems in the United States and Canada, offering in-
depth coverage for rare and endangered species (NatureServe Explorer, n.d.). The NatureServe 
database includes conservation status assessments generated on state, national, and global levels 
based on information from dozens of state, federal, and institutional programs in Canada and the 
United States (NatureServe Strategic Plan, 2012-2016). As mentioned, NatureServe also feeds 
data into the Red List database, and the two organizations collaborate on ongoing assessments. 
But the threatened species list is more than a database: in addition to its archival 
properties, the list ranks and hierarchizes, implying a set of priorities between species: the more 
threatened a species, the more valuable and grievable its members are. The Red List’s category 
of Not Evaluated provides an interesting exception to its function as a list-database hybrid: 
although part of the list, this category includes no data (Brooks, interview). Mike Hoffmann is a 
senior scientific officer at the IUCN Species Survival Commission. He explains: “NE just 
indicates that no attempt to evaluate the status of the taxon has been made. In reality, any species 
not on the Red List (i.e., more than 90 percent of species) is NE” (e-mail communication).  
At the same time, Hoffmann also clarifies that the Red List is not only about registering 
threatened species, but about registering all species. “You can’t talk about the status of 
biodiversity globally unless you’ve assessed everything,” he says. The Red List thus moves well 
beyond threatened species in its aspiration to map, measure, and assess all forms of life on earth. 
Simon Stuart, a key official in the Red List administration, articulates this aspiration when he 
and his colleagues describe two related initiatives: the Encyclopedia of Life and the Barometer of 
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Life. In their words: 
The Encyclopedia of Life (EOL) [is] a powerful initiative, . . . documenting every known 
species. Essential though the EOL is, it needs to be complemented by another project, the 
“Barometer of Life.” This initiative would need to unite taxonomists, biogeographers, 
ecologists, conservationists, and amateur naturalists in a coordinated exploration of 
global biodiversity, with an emphasis on identifying which species are threatened. While 
the EOL will provide a Web page on every species, the barometer would compile 
conservation-related data on distributions, threats, and assessments of extinction risk on a 
subset of species broadly representative of biodiversity as a whole (Stuart et al., 2010, p. 
177). 
The logical platform for this barometer, Stuart et al. argue, is the Red List. Introducing the 
barometer into the list, they continue, would also help fix its current bias toward higher 
vertebrates. In their words:  
The vast majority of species—including most plants, invertebrates, and lower vertebrates, 
and almost all fungi—are still grossly underrepresented. A more finely tuned barometer 
is within reach by expanding the taxonomic base of the Red List to make it much more 
representative of the diversity of life. We anticipate that a representative barometer will 
need to monitor the status of 160,000 species, roughly three times the almost 48,000 
species currently on the Red List (ibid.).  
One of the collaborators on this project is E.O. Wilson, who famously called scientists to “get on 
with the great Linnaean enterprise and finish mapping the biosphere” (quoted in Bowker, 2000, 
p. 645). In the context of the threatened species list, this imperial desire to know and govern the 
life of all species manifests in calculations of future extinction risks. Such calculations are 
DRAFT_Final article available for download at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41292-016-0025-0  
 18 
performed by a veritable army of scientists who labor to assess each species’ status. 
Assessing the Data: Uniformity and Bias in Listing 
 The Red List’s categories and criteria are meant to be “one size fits all”—they “apply to 
grasshoppers as well as blue whales,” John Lamoreux of National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 
also an active assessor in the IUCN Red List administration, tells me in an interview. Hoffmann 
tells me about the assessors that they vary greatly in both disciplinary orientations and 
geographic origin. “They might be field biologists, taxonomists, academics, government 
personnel, park managers, or any one of a number of people,” says Hoffmann (interview). 
Nonetheless, he continues, they are trained to assess all species in a uniform manner. For 
example, the global assessment of mammals, which was completed in 2008, involved 1,700 
experts. In the context of the IUCN, then, the process of “cooking” data has been carefully 
standardized and unified between the myriad “cuisines” to overcome its inherent “polyphony and 
polychrony” (INSERT SOURCE) enabling a globally-authoritative ranking system to emerge in 
the form of the Red List. The widely agreed-upon authority of the Red List thus invites a 
reexamination of Bowker’s argument that “global panopticons are not the way to go in 
biodiversity data” (Bowker, 2000, p. 675). 
 To ensure the uniformity of the list’s risk assessments, IUCN officials train assessors how 
to interpret the categories and criteria across varying taxa and geographies. According to 
Hoffmann, the biggest source of bias is when certain scientists want to list “their” species as 
threatened, “because they’re worried that if it’s not, they’re not going to get money.” The reverse 
also happens, with researchers who prefer a Least Concern listing, “so that they can collect their 
species, put it in a specimen jar, and do research on it.” “Our job,” Hoffmann tells me, “is to be 
the neutral, objective, adjudicators of that process” (interview). IUCN’s Standards and Petitions 
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Subcommittee adjudicates disagreements over Red List designations. The adjudicators are “the 
experts in the criteria, and what they say . . . would essentially be considered gospel” (ibid.).  
Another central challenge to the Red List’s uniformity, according to Hoffmann, is of 
assessors being either too evidentiary or too precautionary: 
You either want perfect data, and therefore you are less likely to list something as 
threatened, so everything’s going to go into Data Deficient, or you’re very precautionary, 
you think everything’s at risk, and so you throw it into a threatened category. Ideally, you 
want somewhere in the middle of those two things. . . . And so, to a large degree, we try 
to balance that by having experienced people on hand to guide the assessment process 
and by requiring some degree of training in the process (ibid.). 
Since scientists tend to be very evidentiary by nature, Hoffmann continues, they often find it 
difficult to work with the Red List, especially in its growing tendency to use fuzzy numbers, i.e. 
ranges that depend on levels of uncertainty and confidence rather than hard numbers. To work 
around the difficulties, an administrative split between threat experts and species experts was 
recently introduced into the system (I will discuss this split, and the related use of fuzzy 
numbers, shortly). 
Modes of Calculation 
Calculation is at the heart of the threatened species list, establishing the connection 
between the biopolitical making and ranking of life and the future-oriented government of risk. 
As part of their scientific and quantitative turn, contemporary threatened species lists are founded 
upon a closed system of minutely defined categories and criteria, factors and ranks. Although 
both lists explored here, and endangered species lists in general, establish a biopolitical order of 
life that ranks species according to their projected risk of elimination, they nonetheless differ in 
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their particular modes of calculation and thus arguably also in the values that determine their 
specific biopolitical rankings. This section will explore these discrepancies in the two lists’ 
calculations of threat, contending that NatureServe’s model presents a more futuristic and 
actionable approach in its fuzzier configurations, while pointing out that the Red List is gradually 
moving in the same direction. 
The Red List classifies taxa into nine categories: Extinct (EX), Extinct in the Wild (EW), 
Critically Endangered (CR), Endangered (EN), Vulnerable (VU), Near Threatened (NT), Least 
Concern (LC), Data Deficient (DD), and Not Evaluated (NE) (IUCN, 2014). The three IUCN 
Red List threatened categories are: Critically Endangered, Endangered, and Vulnerable. The 
system consists of one set of criteria that are applicable to all species and that measure the 
symptoms of endangerment across the board. Five criteria, A through E, are used to classify a 
taxon within these categories. The criteria are: A) a reduction in population size; B) a small, 
reduced, fragmented, or fluctuating geographic range; C) a decline in size of an already small 
population; D) a very small or restricted population; and E) a quantitative analysis indicating the 
probability of extinction. To be listed as Critically Endangered, for example, a species must 
decline by 90 percent or more, cover less than 100km2, or consist of fewer than fifty mature 
individuals (IUCN, 2001). A species need only satisfy one criterion to be assigned to this 
category.  
 Unlike the Red List, NatureServe does not use the breakpoints in the ratings as 
thresholds; rather, these points are viewed as nodes along a continuum of risk that can be 
evaluated jointly with values from other factors. To determine a species’ threat status or rank, 
NatureServe assessors calculate ten factors that impact the species’ risk of extinction or 
extirpation. The ten status factors are grouped into three categories: rarity (six factors), threats 
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(two factors), and trends (two factors). Each rank factor is given a point-score as well as a 
alphabetic rating (for range extent, for example, A to H quantifies the progressive range that a 
species covers, U represents Unknown, and Z represents Zero). For global element status, the 
final assigned conservation status rank uses the G1-G5 scale; an equivalent scale is assigned for 
national and subnational assessments. Finally, a GU status rank (G for Global, U for Unrankable) 
is assigned when there is not enough information to assess a species conservation status, or when 
the information for multiple factors is too imprecise (Faber-Langendoen et al., 2012, p. 1-2).  
Place Figure 1 here: Ursus maritimus (polar bear) is ranked G3 (Vulnerable) by 
NatureServe’s status assessment. 
Faber-Langendoen explains some of the differences in how NatureServe and the IUCN 
Red List calculate the particular ranking of a species’ risk of extinction:  
 IUCN uses the five major criteria and they make an assignment for each. Whichever one 
is most at risk determines the overall rating of the species. . . . Whereas in NatureServe 
we use what we call a “Weight of Evidence” approach, where we look at all the criteria 
that we have, and we actually have eight primary ones and two secondary ones, and we 
roll them together to look at the overall evidence, and that produces our assessment 
category (interview).  
NatureServe’s weighted system takes its ten factors, and enables the user to mathematically 
advantage those factors considered to have greater influence on a given category (threat, trend, or 
rarity) when determining the category’s sub-score. This ultimately, of course, affects the overall 
ranking [REPHRASE]. For example, the category “rarity” weighs more than the category 
“threats” in a relationship of 70:30 (Faber-Langendoen et al., 2012, p. 19). Hence, whereas the 
Red List uses categories and criteria as a hard interval ranking, NatureServe works with softer 
and fuzzier boundaries that arguably enable a more dynamic and flexible mode of biopolitical 
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governance. 
Place Figure 2 here: A comparison between NatureServe and the Red List. Source: Master 
et al.. 2012: 54. Footnote 1 referenced in the table explains that, “Species ranked GXC and 
GHC are presumed or possibly extinct in the wild across their entire native range, but are 
extant in cultivation, in captivity, as naturalized population (or populations) outside its 
historical native range, or as a reintroduced population not yet established. The C modifier 
is only used with status ranks at a global level, and not at national or subnational levels. 
Similarly, IUCN’s EW status is only used at a global level.” Source: Master et al.. 2012, p. 
54. 
NatureServe’s use of ordinal scales is another aspect of its inclination toward fuzzy 
governance. The ordinal system means that although an A rating represents a greater risk of 
extinction or extirpation than a B rating, the magnitude of the difference is not specified. 
Although ordinal scales provide less resolution and make it more difficult to combine factor 
ratings, they are useful in particular settings because they do not require knowledge of the 
precise numeric distance from one category to the next, or to the endpoint, as conservation 
scientists typically do not know exactly how far apart the attributes are from each other. In other 
words, the ranks do not provide the precise quantity of “peril” between the categories of 
“imperiled” and “critically imperiled”; instead, one only needs to rank species as more or less 
imperiled than others, thereby ranking the categories on a linear scale according to their relative 
risk of extinction (Faber-Langendoen et al., 2012, p. 1-2). The use of ordinal scales thus enables 
a differentiation of extinction risks along shifting lines that are meaningful to conservation 
practitioners (Sutula et al., 2006, p. 168-9). The risk of extinction becomes an “ordinal variable,” 
namely a variable that is both exclusive and intrinsic (Bernard, 2004, p. 47).  
Place Figure 3 here: Value ranges for NatureServe’s conservation status ranks (Faber-
Langendoen et al., 2012, p. 21). 
 Despite the differences between the two listing systems and the underlying normative 
preferences embedded in such differences, “we have worked hard to agree on the information 
that we’re going to gather so that at least if we do a NatureServe assessment we can then use that 
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same information to then feed it into the IUCN approach” (Faber-Langendoen, interview). 
Furthermore, since NatureServe functions as IUCN’s de facto “red lister” in North America, “we 
end up producing ratings that are both NatureServe ratings and IUCN ratings,” Faber-
Langendoen tells me. Although he wishes that there was a “single data entry” approach, he notes 
that “currently we gather the information and we actually have to enter it into our approach and 
then enter it again with other information for the IUCN approach.” “It’s a little painful,” he 
admits. So while each list has maintained its own complex administrative culture, list makers 
also strive to streamline and universalize their processes so that they can more easily create a 
network of interconnected lists that feed into each other (Braverman, 2016, p. 33). 
Governing Uncertainty through Fuzzy Numbers 
 The move toward fuzzy numbers arguably constitutes the second, more recent, turn in 
threatened species lists’ mode of governance. This move incorporates an earlier shift in 
mathematics toward a framework of “fuzzy mathematics” (Wang, 2014, p. 82). Put simply, 
instead of hard and fixed numbers, fuzzy numbers theory enables the use of estimates and 
probabilities as indications of uncertainty type and of confidence levels (Akçakaya et al., 2000, 
p. 1004). A regime of fuzzy governance thus emerges the result of the need to better harness the 
unknown, a central component of futuristic governance. Fuzzy number models and their 
resulting information can be represented as triangular, trapezoidal, or rectangular fuzzy graphs, 
depending on the level and type of uncertainty in each case (ibid.). Such models are applied to 
varying degrees by the listing scientists. While NatureServe is already moving toward fuzzier 
governance, as described above, an article from 2010 calls upon Red List administrators to 
similarly apply “fuzzy sets” to deal with some of the problems that arise from uncertainty.  
 Scientists have identified two types of uncertainty in the listing process: epistemic 
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uncertainty—i.e. the uncertainty arising from incomplete data, limitations of measurement 
accuracy et cetera—and vagueness, which they define as the existence of borderline cases arising 
from language (Regan et al., 2000, p. 101). They explain about the latter type of uncertainty: 
Consider the vague concept “endangered.” To most people, and most biologists, it means 
to be in danger of extinction, to be vulnerable to loss. One way of creating a tractable 
definition of a vague concept such as “endangered” is to simply draw a line. So that a 
species is deemed endangered if it has less than n members, then removing one member 
will turn a non-endangered species into an endangered species […]. The term 
“endangered” is now a technical term defined to mean “less than n members,” quite a 
different meaning to that found in a dictionary or understood by most people (ibid., p. 
102). 
The problem with the Red List, according to these scientists, “is that there really ought not to be 
sharp boundaries between the various IUCN categories” (ibid., p. 103). “In practice,” they write, 
uncertainty close to the boundaries of these classifications is resolved by applying the 
precautionary principle, under which the person classifying a species will err on the 
“safe” side and classify the species as critically endangered unless reasonably sure it is 
not. But such decisions are not always transparent, they are subject to individual 
interpretations of reasonable safety, and they raise the spectre of the manager being 
unable to distinguish between species that are “definitely” endangered and those that are 
only “perhaps” endangered. Fuzzy boundaries, however, are more forgiving with 
imprecise data. … [They] allow the separation of threatened and non-threatened species 
without providing sharp cut-off points (ibid., pp. 102, 103). 
While it asks Red Listers to acknowledge the prominent place of uncertainty in their 
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calculations, this scientific account nonetheless defines unknowability only in terms of 
uncertainty, thereby neglecting other unknowns that are inherent to governing future catastrophe. 
Indeed, catastrophe “speaks to the limit of knowledge and radical unknowability. It allows us to 
consider how knowledge and its limits . . . intervene in practices of governing and 
subjectification” (Aradau and van Munster, 2011, pp. 5-6). The expansion of fuzzy governance 
by Red List scientists could become a model for thinking about how to incorporate the unknown 
risks inherent to governing future catastrophe into the listing system.  
“Species Experts” versus “Threat Experts”  
 Largely, the move into the domain of the fuzzy is performed by scientists who are trained 
as generic experts in the listing process (herein, the “threat experts”). Although they are typically 
species experts in their own right, these generic experts do not participate in the listing process 
for their expertise on the assessed species (other species experts serve this purpose), but rather 
for their knowledge of how to make lists. Indeed, the growing complexity of listing processes 
and their enhanced algorithmization (as discussed below) necessitate increasingly prominent 
roles for threat experts in their production. 
 Both the use of fuzzy numbers and the division between species experts and threat 
experts were evident in the threat assessment of the mountain holly fern (Polystichum 
scopulinum) by the Government of British Columbia, which I observed in December 2014. 
During this assessment, educated guesses, ranges, and estimates were brought forth by the threat 
experts to manage uncertain knowledge. Hence, for example, instead of marking the fern’s 
generation time as “Unknown,” the threat experts suggested that the species experts identify a 
“good possibility” that they live between 10 and 20 years, thereby documenting the three 
generation time frame as 45 (triple the average between 10 and 20). More generally, the threat 
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experts guided the fern experts to adopt statements such as “there’s a good possibility,” “it’s a 
hard thing to judge, but my personal opinion is […],” and “it may be hypothetical, but I’d like to 
offer that […].” These statements exemplify the shift from hard numbers to the realm of fuzzy 
ranges and probabilities, especially when hard numbers are difficult to obtain. “The important 
thing,” explains Muir of the CMP, “is to try not to be paralyzed by that lack of data but put your 
best estimate forward.” To achieve this, the threat experts “push our comfort limits as scientists 
to make claims that, in our academic world, when we write a paper, we would be very hard-
pressed to say without giving a lot more evidence or a lot more sources of information” (Muir, 
interview). The concept coined by the CMP to reflect the necessary balance between strict 
adherence to scientific rules and procedures, on the one hand, and flexible and adaptive 
assessments, on the other, is “open standards.” “We have developed these Open Standards so 
that they can be applied at any geographic, temporal, or programmatic scale,” the CMP states 
(2013, p. 1).  
 The growing reliance on fuzzy numbers and open standards in the lists’ administration 
has dictated a parallel increase in their reliance on algorithms. This algorithmization is evident, 
for example, in the adoption of the “threat calculator” by different threatened species list 
administrations. 
The Threat Calculator 
In March 2014, I attended the list assessment meeting of the Committee on the Status of 
Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC). Since 1977, COSEWIC’s 150 or so scientific 
experts convene twice a year to assess Canada’s imperiled species. In 2003, the Canadian 
Species at Risk Act (SARA) mandated the government of Canada to consider COSEWIC’s 
designations when listing wildlife species at risk. According to Dave Fraser, a government 
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official of British Columbia and chair of COSEWIC’s Criteria Working Group, the Canadian 
government endorses between 50 and 75 percent of COSEWIC’s assessments and assigns legal 
protections for those formally listed species (interview).  
The “threat calculator” in particular exemplifies how technologies of calculation 
established in the context of the “apolitical” list converge into political systems of ranking. In 
2009, NatureServe developed the threat calculator to automate the process of assigning 
conservation status ranks. Of the three ranking categories (rarity, threat, trends), NatureServe’s 
threat calculator measures only the second category, namely the level of threat. The threat 
calculator has already been adopted by several national listing systems and is currently adjusted 
to automate certain parts of the Red List ranking system as well. Recently, COSEWIC adopted 
NatureServe’s threat calculator and has been applying it across the board to assess the threat 
category of all candidate species. According to Dave Fraser, who has pushed for the threat 
calculator’s application in Canada: “It became really clear that we needed a more transparent and 
consistent way of classifying future threats, [which was] very difficult to do when everybody 
was using a different set of words” (interview).  
 In place of a “different set of words,” the threat calculator is an Excel spreadsheet with a 
dropdown menu onto which assessors inscribe the relevant figures according to three threat 
categories: scope, severity, and timing. Based on this data, a computer program then calculates 
the Overall Threat Impact, which is expressed through a four-point score: Very High (red), High 
(orange), Medium (yellow), or Low (green) (Master et al., 2012, p. 27; see Figure 4). “Because 
it’s a prediction into the future,” Fraser tells me, “you have no way of measuring its accuracy.” 
Nonetheless, he explains, “if you’ve got High or Very High scores you’re looking at species that 
are automatically going to be strong candidates for having met the decline criteria that would 
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lead to a listing” (Fraser, interview). This way, what matters most is not future consequences that 
may or may not occur, but “the capacity to act in the face of uncertainty, to render data 
actionable” (Amoore, 2011, p. 29). Indeed, the beauty of the futuristic vision is precisely that it 
does not have to be true. “In fact, expectations are often particularly fruitful when they fail to 
materialize” (McGoey, 2012, p. 8). In the words of Brian Massumi: “Threat is the future cause of 
a change in the present” (2005, p. 35). 
Place Figure 4 here: Screen shot from NatureServe’s Overall Threat Impact table, used 
with permission. 
Fraser describes the benefits of the automated threat calculation process: “It’s the same 
reason that you have checklists to operate an aircraft. Here’s a step-by-step process and here is 
how you check every instrument and everything down the line before you take off. So this does 
the same thing: it makes you go through all the threats and make sure that you’ve understood and 
actually accounted for every potential threat to this species and assessed whether it’s a big deal 
or not” (interview). And although a moss is not comparable to a whale from a biological point of 
view, Fraser explains, “the future for this moss is looking Low, Medium, or High—and from our 
point of view, that’s all we need to know.” This depiction calls to mind Amoore’s “data 
derivatives,” which she defines as visualized risk flags or scores “drawn from an amalgam of 
disaggregated fragments of data, inferred from across the gaps between data and projected onto 
an array of uncertain futures” (Amoore, 2011, p. 24). 
Uncertainty plays an important role in the threat assessment. Fraser highlights that while 
“the threats calculator [gives] us a way of confirming what we were seeing,” this is not always 
the case. Sometimes, he continues “there are declines and the threat calculator did not predict 
them and cannot explain why.” Fraser continues: 
[When] there’s nothing in the threats calculator that clearly explains why something is 
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happening, then the other alternative is there’s something going on that we don’t 
understand. . . . [In these cases,] there is the ability to either put in “Unknown” when you 
have a threat that you just don’t understand how big it is or what the scope of it is, or you 
can use range ranks which says, “Okay, it’s somewhere between ‘small’ and ‘large’ but I 
don’t know where it is in there.” . . . But what this does, at least as far as we are 
concerned, it tells you when you’ve got a lot of uncertainty (interview). 
Uncertainty (in terms of “known unknowns” at least) is therefore not excluded from the calculus; 
rather, it is identified as such and thereby governed differently in that it is harnessed toward 
governing the known. The unknown thus provides “a different kind of abstraction that is based 
precisely on an absence, on what is not known, on the very basis of uncertainty” (Amoore, 2011, 
p. 27).  
Just how powerful the threat calculator is exemplified by its default automatic operation: 
if a species is assessed through the calculator as having Very High or High impact levels, it 
automatically qualifies for listing regardless of any other factors. “This is a lot of power,” Fraser 
acknowledges. Precisely because of this immense power, and despite his leadership role as Mr. 
Threats Calculator, Fraser cautions against relying too heavily on the calculator. “The caution is, 
of course, [that] it’s relatively easy to score too alarmistly,” he tells me, adding, “you have to be 
careful you don’t give it too much weight because it is based on future predictions and that’s 
always a bit dicey.” “Scientists hate predicting the future,” he further explains, “because it’s very 
hard to quantify. So we take these Very Highs and Highs cautiously, because one of the 
problems with this system is that many experts tend to be quite alarmist and they’re not experts 
on the threats calculator, they’re experts on the species” (interview). 
Fraser’s words of caution call attention to the ways in which computerized algorithms are 
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slowly replacing the experience and professionalism of the species experts. Substituting 
precision for validity, the threat calculator replaces ethical conflicts over the content of the 
entries with seemingly technical data calculations (Bowker and Star, 1999, p. 24). Fraser 
provides an example of how this displacement unfolds in practice: 
A little while ago I ran through an assessment with a species of bird that nests in old 
growth trees. The biggest threat to that species, according to the experts, is logging. But 
when we actually assessed the amount of logging that’s going to happen in the next 
decade against the range of that species, it only came out as a medium threat, and that 
amazed them. They thought, ‘well, if this is only a medium threat, what does a high threat 
look like?’ And I gave them some examples of some species that have high threats. And 
it put the whole thing into some perspective. The biggest threat you’re dealing with may 
not be such a big deal when you look at the fate that other species have in assessment. So 
it’s a very good way of evening the playing field between species, and that’s really 
important when you deal with the assessment of everything, from mosses to whales 
(interview). 
As a generic and global conservation value, threat works to “even the playing field” between 
widely disparate species and their experts.  
 But the displacement of man by machine, and that of local and species experts by global 
and generic assessment processes, is never absolute nor complete. The assessment process 
includes formal points of entry that enable, invite even, the infusion of “subjective,” expert-based 
knowledge. One such point occurs when the calculator generates a final threat rank (“calculated 
rank”), but the database includes an option for the assessor to insert a different rank (“assigned 
rank”), providing she inserts an oral explanation (“assigned rank reason”) (Figure 5). Margaret 
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Ormes of NatureServe explains: “There are times when . . . you as a scientist may not agree with 
what the calculator is returning. So if people decide to stick with their assigned rank, if they 
decide that their assigned rank is correct and the calculated [one] is wrong, they [can] document 
why they are keeping it. . . . We wanted to allow for the fact that scientists may decide that the 
calculated rank is just simply incorrect” (Ormes, interview). When the assigned and calculated 
ranks differ from each other, the first assumption, however, is that the assessors “miscoded a 
field in some way” (ibid.). 
Place Figure 5 here: NatureServe’s Excel spreadsheet with figures from an old assessment. 
Courtesy of Margaret Ormes, NatureServe. 
Algorithms and (De)mystification 
The threat calculator is one of a growing number of tools and techniques that automate 
the threatened species lists’ assessment process. Increasingly, NatureServe uses such algorithm-
based tools, encoded into rules, to translate disparate data on species or ecosystems into 
rankings. Although they are seemingly technical, close attention to the algorithmic rules of 
operation can help unveil the assumptions and values imbedded in the list’s assessments and 
ranking. For example, when the typical point-based ranking system is irrelevant or impossible, 
algorithmic rules kick in that define a “state of exception” to the point- and weight-based rules, 
identifying instances in which the rules do not apply. In such instances—which are numerous—
the status is assigned automatically, overriding the discretion of scientists. For example, an 
automatic status of Unrankable (“U”) is assigned without any further calculations in those cases 
for which the minimum factor combination requirements have not been satisfied. In practice, the 
automatic rules that preclude detailed calculations look like this: 
Rule: Automatic X [i.e., Extinct] Status Assignment Based on Extreme Rarity IF at least 
one of the rarity status factors Range Extent, Area of Occupancy, Population Size, or 
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Number of Occurrences has an assigned status rating of Z [i.e., zero] AND the assigned 
status ratings for the remaining rarity status factors are Z AND/OR range ratings that 
include Z, THEN an X = Extinct/ Eliminated or Extirpated (GX, NX, SX) conservation 
status is automatically assigned for the element (Faber-Langendoen et al., 2012, p. 15; 
highlights in original). 
The technical aspects of this rule demarcate both the span and the limit of scientific knowledge.  
 More broadly, the threat assessments’ growing reliance on algorithms goes hand-in-hand 
with the emergence of modelling as the current trend in scientific method, which in turn is 
intimately related to the assessors’ increased use of fuzzy numbers. Indeed, algorithms replace 
scientists’ discretion and old-fashioned hard numbers with rule-engendered, automated 
calculations. The gradual algorithmization of the threatened listing process thus emerges not only 
as a way of managing a growing mass of information, but also as a way of filling in the gaps and 
holes in the known and replacing them with calculated predictions of the unknown. 
Consequently, algorithms are indispensible for assessing future threats, the bread-and-butter of 
the list’s biopolitical project. The prevalence of algorithms in list production has had profound 
effects on the transparency and the public availability of these lists. To understand why, one 
needs to consider how algorithms work and how they affect the data they work upon.  
 Often referred to as the father of algorithm analysis, computer scientist and 
mathematician Donald Knuth defines algorithms as a “set of rules or directions for getting a 
specific output from a specific input.” “The distinguishing feature of an algorithm,” he explains, 
“is that all vagueness must be eliminated; the rules must describe operations that are so simple 
and so well defined that they can be executed by a machine” (Knuth, 1996, p. 59). 
Communications scholar Tarleton Gillespie would disagree with Knuth on the transparent nature 
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of algorithms. He argues that algorithms operate upon data by “selecting” the most relevant data. 
“Algorithms are inert, meaningless machines until paired with databases upon which to 
function,” Gillespie writes (2014, p. 169). The data is prepared for the algorithm, he argues, 
“cleaned up” so that the algorithms could then act upon it, seemingly automatically. The 
ostensibly automatic work of the algorithm is both an intentional and a crucial part of its 
function, he explains, as “algorithms are also stabilizers of trust, practical and symbolic 
assurances that their evaluations are fair and accurate, free from subjectivity, error, or attempted 
influence” (ibid.). Unlike Knuth, Gillespie argues that the criteria and code of algorithms are 
generally obscured and their procedures hidden. There is something “impenetrable about 
algorithms,” he says. “They are deliberately obfuscated, and they work with information on a 
scale that is hard to comprehend” (ibid.). For Gillespie, the algorithm is more in line with what 
Bruno Latour refers to as a “blackboxing technology,” a form of scientific knowledge whose 
“work is made invisible by its own success,” becoming obscure through its own complexity 
(Latour, 1999, p. 304). 
My interviewees for this project have, for the most part, voiced Knuth’s and rejected 
Gillespie’s approach, offering that at least in the context of endangered lists, algorithmization is 
generally a transparent and demystifying process. Margaret Ormes explains along these lines: “A 
lot of people felt that the NatureServe ranking process was too much of a blackbox. . . . There 
was a lot of subjectivity. So the goal was to create something that was not a blackbox, something 
that was transparent and repeatable” (interview). She clarifies: “[W]e really wanted a 
methodology that would be repeatable, so that if two people used the same data that they would 
come up with the same rank. So that’s what the calculator helps address, that repeatability factor. 
And it also makes our ranks more transparent. So if I send the rank calculator to someone they 
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can see exactly how that rank was arrived at, and they can disagree with the data, if they have 
more information; it can take the mystery out of how the ranks are assigned” (ibid.). Faber-
Langendoen of NatureServe explains, similarly, that: 
Those species folk, they may not know what the algorithm is doing, because they are not 
the ones who are assigned to do the ranking. They are there giving evidence, if you will. 
But if something seems really wrong to them, then the assessor should have the ability to 
explain exactly how this works. So although this is an algorithm, we don’t want to hide 
away how it works because this would defeat the purpose of the entire process. There are 
models that are real blackboxes. I’ve used models where I don’t know what’s going on, 
and I don’t like it, because I can’t actually really see what it’s doing. So there are these 
kinds of problems with ecological models. In the case of the IUCN and NatureServe, 
[however,] we tried to make sure this doesn’t happen (interview). 
Population biologist Bob Lacy uses more complicated algorithmic models to assess the 
viability of populations as part of a Population Viability Analysis (PVA) (for example, under the 
Red List’s Criterion E). His position on the effects of algorithms is that: 
[A]lgorithms make explicit how we think the processes work, rather than leaving the 
judgments to be based on undocumented conceptual frameworks and arguments by 
biologists to just “trust me, I am the expert.” Yet I can also see that for many others who 
don’t know what those computer programs are doing, the sense of trust versus 
demystification goes the other way: they might be willing (or maybe not) to trust that we 
know what we are doing with the calculations and simulations, but for them the analyses 
are not at all transparent (Lacy, e-mail communication; see also Braverman, 2015c). 
Finally, from Matt Muir’s perspective: “As long as people understand that the algorithm is based 
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on these criteria and these sorts of value judgments, then they shouldn’t be mystical, right? They 
shouldn’t be magical. But I think there’s a risk that, for some people, algorithms replace critical 
thinking” (interview).  
While the assessment performed in the context of the threatened species list is 
undoubtedly becoming more and more mechanized and algorithmic, scholars and scientists alike 
debate about whether these processes are mystifying or demystifying, obfuscating or revealing. 
Communications scholar Ted Striphas (2015) identifies the historic basis of this tension in the 
semantics of the term “algorithm,” which encompasses both “algorism” (associated with zero, 
empty, cypher) and “algorithm” (i.e., deciphering). In effect, “on the one hand, we have 
algorithms—a set of mathematical procedures whose purpose is to expose some truth or 
tendency about the world. On the other hand, we have algorisms—coding systems that might 
reveal, but that are equally if not more likely to conceal. The one boasts of providing access to 
the real; the other, like an understudy, holds its place” (Striphas, 2015, pp. 404-5). Striphas 
emphasizes that what is at stake in algorithmic culture is the privatization of process (ibid., p. 
407). Similar debates have also unfolded in the STS scholarship on medicine, where scholars 
argue that mathematization has by no way done away with the qualitative assessments and 
subjective interpretations of statistical significance (Armstrong, 2007). In the context of the 
threatened species list, too, the algorithmization process encompasses the tensions between 
public and transparent processes and expert or private decision-making. 
Conclusion 
Threatened species lists place a grid over the animal and plant kingdoms, furnishing 
particular forms of nonhuman life with both a dataset and a threat rank that together establish 
their singularity and elevate them from other, unevaluated and unranked, forms of life. Life, 
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represented here in species units, must be assessed and ranked if it is to be protected and saved 
from the catastrophe of mass extinction. But whereas the process of list-making in conservation 
is about affirmatively saving species-conceived life, it also sorts out and regulates to the domains 
of non-protection such forms of life who are not valued and privileged. The life that is worth 
conserving obtains meaning through an expansive calculus that deals with the future’s 
unknowability through ostensibly technical solutions, such as fuzzy numbers, open standards, 
and ordinal scales.  
Focusing on two prominent data-listing-ranking systems for threatened species—the 
IUCN Red List of Threatened Species and NatureServe—my article has illuminated the 
extensive behind-the-scenes labor that goes into the process of calculating the imperilment level 
of a species. This labor designs databases that increasingly encompass not only threatened 
species but all species; the data is then fed into ranking systems that elaborately calculate the 
species’ risk of extinction. I have dwelled in some detail on the differences and similarities 
between the two lists’ ranking systems, demonstrating the minute dilemmas experienced by their 
administrators and the transformation of their procedures toward an increase in quantification, 
automation, and algorithmization alongside their move toward fuzzier forms of governance. 
Such reflections illuminate that not only lists but listers, too, are lively players in this process. 
My article has given some of these listers—a range of scientists with myriad voices—a long-
neglected presence in the process, rendering their labor and motivations visible. The “threat 
calculator” in particular both reveals and embodies the underlying tensions between known and 
unknown, hard and fuzzy numbers, automation and discretion, species experts and threat experts, 
and, finally, the mystifying and demystifying aspects of algorithmization.  
At the end of the day, the Red List and NatureServe risk rankings—though ostensibly 
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scientific and apolitical—serve as the authoritative basis for establishing priorities for the 
conservation of actual species by a large number of governmental and nongovernmental 
agencies. I have documented in particular how this scientific ordering is translated into action in 
the context of Canada’s list of endangered species. Considered together, threatened species lists 
enable the emergence of expansive biopolitical projects of making and anticipating the future of 
species life. 
Interviews and Observations 
Brooks, T. Head, Science and Knowledge Unit, IUCN. Telephone, January 25, 2014. 
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC). Participatory 
observation. Halifax, Canada, April 27 - May 2, 2014. 
Faber-Langendoen, D. Senior Research Ecologist. NatureServe. Telephone, February 3, 2015; 
August 6, 2015. 
Fraser, D. Unit Head, Species Conservation Science. Ministry of Environment, Province of 
British Columbia; Member, COSEWIC; Chair, Criteria Working Group. In-person, April 
29, 2014; Telephone, June 18, 2014; e-mail communication, December 9, 2014. 
Hoffmann, M. Senior Scientific Officer. Species Survival Commission, IUCN. Telephone, 
January 9, 2014; e-mail communications, March 27, 2014; June 26, 2015. 
Lacy, R. Population biologist, Former chairperson, CBSG. E-mail communication, June 24, 
2014. 
Lamoreux, J. Biodiversity Analyst, National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. Telephone, January 
7, 2014. 
Muir, M. Member, Conservation Measures Partnership. Telephone, December 16, 2014. 
Ormes, M. Director, Science Information Resources, NatureServe, University of Massachusetts 
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Boston. Telephone, November 1, 2014. 
Suckling, K. Executive Director, Center for Biological Diversity. E-mail communication, August 
3, 2015. 
Threat Assessment. Mountain holly fern (Polystichum scopulinum), the Government of British 
Columbia. Conference call observation, December 9, 2014. 
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